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The amendment to the German Trade and Crafts Code in 2004 offers a natural experiment to asses
the causal effects of this reform on the probabilities of being self-employed and transition into and
out of self-employment, using cross-sections (2002-2006) of German microcensus data. This study
applies the difference-in-differences technique in logit models for four occupational groups. Easing
the educational entry requirement has fostered self-employment significantly for less qualified
craftsmen, almost doubling the entry probability, even as exit rates remained unaffected. Weaker
effects occur for other occupational groups. These findings have implications for the design of
regulations with educational requirements.
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I INTRODUCTION
Invoking an entrepreneurial spirit is widely regarded as a remedy to the disease of high unemployment
and a source of economic dynamism. However, entrepreneurship remains one of the scarcest resources
in many European countries, leaving unanswered the question of what restrains people from starting
a business. In Germany, entrepreneurship measured as either the rate of self-employment or the
rate of transition into self-employment is lower than in the United States (cf. Holtz-Eakin and
Rosen, 2005). In addition to credit constraints (e.g., Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Blanchflower
and Oswald, 1998; Hurst and Lusardi, 2004; Fossen, forthcoming; Holtz-Eakin and Rosen, 2005),
entry regulation appears to hamper entrepreneurship in Europe, particularly in Germany where
craftsmanship accounts for approximately one-sixth of all self-employed people and represents a
vibrant, well-organized, important economic sector that comprises not only artisans, but also building
and construction trades. This group of entrepreneurs is highly regulated by the German Trade and
Crafts Code (HwO), which imposes an educational requirement on entry into self-employment.
The mandatory qualification as a master craftsman required to start a business in Germany as such
dates back to the late nineteenth century. Then, as today, proponents of the entry requirement (e.g.,
German Confederation of Skilled Crafts, 2003) cited market failures due to information asymmetries
and external effects, while opponents (e.g., German Deregulation Commission, 1991; German
Monopolies Commission, 1998, 2002) have objected that these regulations lead to inefficiencies.
The government justifies the regulation mainly as a means to prevent danger to health. However,
the master craftsman qualification underwent a dramatic change after amendment to the HwO in
January 2004, which decreased the number of occupations subject to these regulations from 94 to
41. Moreover, the entry requirements for the remaining 41 occupations were relaxed.
Empirical studies related to this topic use aggregate data from many countries to investigate
the effects of regulation on entrepreneurship, as in the influential work by Djankov et al. (2002)
and subsequently in research by Klapper et al. (2006), Ciccone and Papaioannou (2007), and
Stel et al. (2007). Kaplan et al. (2007) and Bruhn (2008) also present evidence that lower entry
costs increase entry into entrepreneurship. Bruhn (2008), Ardagna and Lusardi (2008, 2009), and
Prantl and Spitz-Oener (2009) add to the almost unanimous evidence against entry regulation using
microdata. The latter discuss regulatory effects in light of the German unification in 1990, explicitly
considering the educational entry requirement in craftsmanship. Finally, Müller (2006) provides the
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first descriptive insights about outcomes after the reform but no evidence about the reform’s causal
effects and does not use individual data.
This study, in contrast, contributes to literature on entry regulation and entrepreneurship by
providing the initial causal evidence of the effects of this reform, exploiting the policy change in
2004 as a natural experiment. For this analysis, I use repeated cross-sections (2002-2006) of German
microcensus data and apply the difference-in-differences approach to estimate the effects of the
policy change on the probabilities of being self-employed, as well as of transitioning into and out
of self-employment for four distinct occupational groups. This contribution adds to a particular
strand in literature on entry regulation and entrepreneurship, in that it explores a special kind of
entry regulation, namely, an educational requirement. Furthermore, this work connects to the few
studies that use microdata to investigate entry regulation and entrepreneurship, and it is one of the
rare studies that focuses explicitly on craftsmanship.
In the next section, I employ a simple theoretical model to demonstrate that two distinct kinds of
entry regulation exist and may have different effects on the probability of starting a new business.
On the one hand, regulations in the form of fees, bribes, and so on, which solely decrease expected
profits (i.e., rip-off regulations), influence this probability negatively. On the other hand, pay-off
regulations – such as the educational requirement for German craftsmen – have an ambiguous effect
on the probability of starting a business, because their influence moves through two channels: raising
human capital and raising the costs of entrepreneurship. Although studies like Praag and Cramer
(2001) and Parker (1996) emphasize the strong positive effect of human capital accumulation on
entrepreneurial success, it remains unclear which effect dominates a priori. Hence the question
arises, Is the entry requirement imposed by the HwO a rip-off regulation or a pay-off regulation?
To shed some light on this question, I estimate the direction and magnitude of the causal effects of
the policy change in 2004 in an econometric analysis.
The empirical results provide evidence that the probability of being self-employed increased with
the amendment to the HwO. The strongest relative increase significantly raised the probability to a
level more than 20% higher than a hypothetical situation without the reform for an occupational
group with relatively low qualified workers and a relatively low propensity to engage in entrepreneur-
ship. This group has been completely exempted from an entry requirement. The reform also seems
to have increased the probability of being self-employed for professions that experienced only a
reduction or a partial exemption from the entry requirement, though these effects are weaker. The
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analysis shows further that these increases result from increasing the probabilities of entry, while the
probabilities of exit from self-employment have remained virtually unaffected by the policy change.
In the remainder of this paper, I illustrate the institutional framework of the natural experiment
and outline the empirical approach used to obtain the results with described data.
II THEORY
A simple static model related to the work of Lucas (1978), Evans and Jovanovic (1989), and
Ardagna and Lusardi (2009) illustrates the effects of regulation on the individual decision to start
a new business. The model incorporates the special nature of an educational entry regulation by
introducing regulation-induced effects on human capital. This extension distinguishes two kinds of
regulation, which affect the probability of engaging in entrepreneurial activity differently.
Equation (1) describes the decision of a risk-neutral individual i at the beginning of each period
t, to remain in his current employment status (entry = 0) or to start a new business activity




1 if pi = R(f,X)− (c+ f + ν) + ε ≥ y
0 otherwise.
(1)
As an entrepreneur, the individual’s gross income, which is subject to an exogenous shock ε with
distribution function Γ (ε) and probability density function γ(ε), amounts to pi. The entrepreneurial
profit is equal to the revenue function R(f,X), less the costs of operating a business C = (c+ f + ν).
Here, c denotes the production costs, and two kinds of regulatory costs exist from the individual’s
perspective: rip-off regulation costs ν and pay-off regulation costs f . Rip-off regulation costs refer
to any kind of expense or other monetary obstacles, such as fees, bribes, forgone profits due to
bureaucratic delay, and so on, that have solely a negative impact on entrepreneurial income pi. In
contrast, pay-off regulation costs can have a positive effect on entrepreneurial income. Assuming
∂R
∂f > 0 and
∂2R
∂f2 < 0, entrepreneurial revenue is increasing in f with diminishing marginal returns.
On the one hand, pay-off regulation costs decrease pi by f , but on the other hand, f reflects an
investment in human capital. Finally, X represents individual characteristics such as age, gender,
education, and ability.
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Therefore, the probability to enter entrepreneurship is given by
P (entry) = P [R(f,X)− (c+ f + ν) + ε ≥ y] =
1− P [ε < y −R(f,X) + (c+ f + ν)] = 1− Γ [y −R(f,X) + (c+ f + ν)] = 1− Γ (G). (2)
Using these results, the effects of a change in regulatory costs on the individual probability of
starting a new business are as follows: A marginal increase in the rip-off regulation costs hampers







= −γ(G) ≤ 0. (3)
An increase in the pay-off regulation costs though creates an unknown outcome. We do not know




















Equation (5) further shows that regulation costs pay off positively when entrepreneurial revenue




> 0 if ∂R(f,X)∂f > 1
≤ 0 otherwise.
(5)
By comparing rip-off and pay-off regulations, we discern three properties regarding regulation
and entrepreneurship. At the starting point where ν = f = 0, rip-off and pay-off regulations are
indistinguishable. Now suppose a policy change increases the regulatory costs in two identical
countries A and B. Country A increases ν from 0 to ν1 > 0, leaving everything else unchanged,
whereas country B increases f from 0 to f1 > 0, ceteris paribus. In country A, the probability
of engaging in entrepreneurial activity decreases according to Equation (3), but the situation in
country B is different: If the human capital effect outweighs the impact of the costs, regulation can
raise entry probability. Thus, the second result is that the pay-off regulation can have a positive
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effect on the likelihood to become an entrepreneur. Note further that the human capital effect is
stronger when f is smaller in this model.
A third finding reveals that the probability of entry is always higher if a pay-off regulation is
imposed instead of a rip-off regulation for all ν = f > 0. Therefore, country B should have more
entrepreneurs. Because it is unknown whether the pay-off or rip-off effects of an educational entry
regulation prevail, the causal effect of a policy change must be quantified empirically to determine
the kind of regulation.
III THE AMENDMENT TO THE GERMAN TRADE AND CRAFTS CODE IN 2004 AS A NATURAL
EXPERIMENT
Institutional Background
Over the course of time, three key institutions for German craftsmanship have emerged: the
small proof of competence (Kleiner Befähigungsnachweis), the grand proof of competence (Großer
Befähigungsnachweis), and the register of self-employed craftsmen (Handwerksrolle). The small
proof of competence restricted the training of apprentices to craftsmen who held a master certificate,
though such a degree was not required to start a business. However, the grand proof of competence
mandated that craftsmen obtain a master certificate for both activities, to train and to have a new
business listed in the register.
Since 1965, legislation has distinguished between restricted regular craftsmanship (Vollhandwerke),
which requires a grand proof of competence, and unrestricted trades similar to crafts (Handwerk-
sähnliche Gewerbe), referred to in this text as A-occupations and B2-occupations, respectively.
Craftsmen in A-occupations, in contrast to those in B2-occupations, must hold a master degree for
admission as an entrepreneur.1
The qualification as a master craftsman is the highest professional qualification in craftsmanship.2
To attain it, a person must complete several stages of training and examinations. Full-time courses
to prepare for the master exam take one to three years, and the occupation-specific overall costs
range, according to Chambers of Crafts and Trade, from 4,000 to 10,000 Euro. The master exam
tests both occupation-specific skills and general education in business and commercial knowledge,
as well as law. Moreover, the exam contains a pedagogical portion, because holding a master degree
makes the craftsman eligible to train apprentices. Those who have passed the examination are
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recorded in the register ; in rarely granted exceptions, some people may be recorded in the register
without a master degree.
This setting was the situation just prior to amendment to the HwO in 2004, which this analysis
exploits to assess the causal effects of entry regulation on entrepreneurship. The principle element
of this reform was a reduction in f , or the costs of entry into entrepreneurship, by exempting some
occupations completely and others partially from the requirement of attaining a master degree.
Entrepreneurs and Craftsmen in Germany
The amendment came into effect on January 1, 2004, in the context of a series of reforms aimed at the
German social system and labor market called Agenda 2010.3 Figure 1 summarizes self-employment
numbers in Germany before and in the aftermath of the reform.
Insert Figure 1 about here
The graph clearly shows that the development of self-employment in Germany is strictly increasing.
On close inspection, the graph exhibits a somewhat steeper slope after March 2004, and the share
of self-employed among the working population increased at an almost constant rate until 2005.
The number of craftsmen also decreased rather powerfully prior to the amendment to the HwO in
2004, which was reversed to some extent afterward. The rate of self-employed among craftsmen is
not decreasing simultaneously with the number of craftsmen though, which shows that the decline
before the reform was mostly due to dependently employed craftsmen. In contrast, the period
after the reform exhibits a rising number of craftsmen in combination with an increasing rate of
self-employment among craftsmen. To what extent is this effect due to the amendment to the HwO?
IV EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
Definition of the Treatment and Control Groups
The amendment to the HwO defines certain occupational groups that are subject to different degrees
of regulation. I match each reported occupation of an individual in the German microcensus with
the respective occupation listed in the law. With this information, I can construct four occupational
dummies that reflect the different intensities of the treatment.
The deregulation of the master degree requirement, which is the main element of the policy
change, generated a group of 53 B1-occupations by splitting up the former 94 A-occupations.
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Craftsmen belonging to the group of B1-occupations were allowed to start businesses without a
master degree but still had to demonstrate their ability to train. These B1-occupations represent the
main treatment group, referred to as non-mandatory-requirement craftsmen (nmc). Some examples
are tile and mosaic layers, coppersmiths, turners, tailors, millers, and photographers.
The remaining 41 A-occupations comprise three more groups. First, a group of strictly regulated
occupations remained subject to virtually the same requirements as before the policy change; they
still needed a mandatory master certificate to enter entrepreneurship. These vocations, referred to
as strict occupations, serve as the control group. They include chimney sweeps, opticians, hearing
aid audiologists, orthopedic technicians, and dental technicians.
Second, according to the reform, no master certificate would be required for jobs that can be
learned within three months, which defines the second treatment group that experienced only a
small reduction of the entry costs. It resembles the control group, in that an entry requirement
is still mandatory. However, these A-occupations that use the easyjobs-rule to be exempted from
the master requirement can be grouped separately as easyjobs (cf. Müller, 2006): masons and
concreters, painters and varnishers, metalworkers, motor vehicle body and vehicle construction
mechanics, bike mechanics, information electronics technicians, vehicle technicians, and butchers.
Third, for the remainder of the A-occupations, entry restrictions were loosened by permitting
senior journeymen to start a business without a master degree. This senior journeyman rule defines
the third treatment group (sjr occupations). This group includes professions such as roofers, surgical
instrument makers, gunsmiths, plumbers, gas and water fitters, joiners, and pastry cooks. However
entry has not been deregulated completely, because this third element of the policy change obligates
a senior journeyman to prove six years of work experience, four in a decision-making position, in his
or her prospective occupation.
Methodology
The empirical strategy exploits the reform of the regulatory framework of entrepreneurial craftsmen
in 2004 as a natural experiment. This approach reveals evidence of the causal effects of the regulatory
change, because the policy event exogenously provides a control group that resembles a control
group in a randomized laboratory experiment. With such a group, I can contrast the changes in the
average outcomes of occupational choices before and after the reform in each of the groups affected
by the policy with the changes in the average outcomes of occupational choices before and after the
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reform in the control group. The difference in these changes, known as the difference-in-differences
(DID) estimator, represents the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), which equals the
average causal effect of the reform (e.g., Blundell and Dias, 2009).
I use data from 2002 to 2006 for three occupational groups (nmc, sjr, easyjobs) that were subject
to regulation changes of different intensities as the treatment groups (cf. Meyer, 1995) and the group
of strictly regulated occupations as a comparison group. To find the ATT with the DID approach
in this context means specifically comparing the difference in the average self-employment rates of
each of the three treatment groups before and after the reform with the average self-employment
rates of the strict occupation group before and after the reform.
The policy change could have influenced the self-employment rate positively, negatively, or not at
all. However, the direction of the effect depends on how the new policy has caused the entry and exit
rates to change. Generally, an increase in the self-employment rate could result from a higher entry
rate or a lower exit rate. A decrease could result from a lower entry rate or a higher exit rate or
from a higher entry rate, which in turn is exceeded by an even higher exit rate. Another possibility
is that the self-employment rate overall remains unchanged if the policy shifts the entry rate as well
as the exit rate equally in the same direction. Therefore, with this analysis, I investigate not only
the probability of being self-employed but also the probability of entry into self-employment and
exit from self-employment.
Furthermore, identifying the ATT using DID requires the assumption that the treatment groups
and the control group experience common trends. This implies that macro shocks exert the same
effects on both groups. For example, a sudden decrease of the interest rate should influence trades
related to health and hygiene, which are common among the strictly regulated group, exactly
as it does the building and construction trades, which are part of the easyjobs group. If so, a
hypothetical trend without a reform in the treated group would parallel the trend of the control
group in the post-policy period. Otherwise, it would be unclear whether differences between these
groups are caused by the reform or other factors.
This setting is not subject to a frequent concern in natural experiments. That is, the problem of
self-selection does not exist, because the different treatment groups are assigned by law, and the
policy change was proclaimed for the first time in March 2003 (cf. Müller, 2006). Consequently
there was only a short time for people to adjust and change occupations in expectation of the reform.
Moreover, after the announcement of plans for the amendment to the HwO, a controversy arose
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with an unpredictable outcome. It was therefore unknown which occupations would receive what
intensity of treatment before the reform actually came into being. Considering this unpredictability,
it seems unlikely that craftsmen would have changed jobs in anticipation of the effects caused by
the complicated new rules. Thus, adjusting behavior cannot challenge the identification of the ATT
parameter.
After the regulations were eased B2-occupations could be substitutes for similar B1 or A-
occupations, which means that the compositions of the treatment and control groups might change
systematically. This change would bias the estimated ATT parameter, because DID requires the
treatment and control groups to remain unchanged over time to ensure before-and-after comparability.
Although B2-occupations are excluded from the analysis when the data set can distinguish them,
some of these professions remain in the sample. Because they remain in the same group (e.g., nmc)
over the entire period, according to their time-invariant job definition, their presence in the sample
does little harm. In addition, the analysis includes a set of observable, time-varying covariates and
other characteristics to control for the potential for systematic differences in the populations over the
two periods. Moreover, most professions require specific education and work experience, especially
the sjr occupations, the easyjobs, and the control group. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume
that changes in unobserved factors are the same between the treatment and control groups.
In estimating the effects of the reform for all treatments with repeated cross-sections from 2002
to 2006 in logit models using the maximum likelihood estimator, all three treatment groups are
included jointly in the regression models to yield more precise estimates.
In a linear probability model, the ATT equals the coefficient of the interaction term between
the treatment and the post-policy dummy. This interaction effect reflects the comparison of the
changes of predicted probabilities before and after the reform for the treatment and control groups.
However, predicted probabilities are not bounded by 0 and 1 in the linear probability model, so the
preferred specification is the logit model for observation i described by Equation (6):
Prob(Yi = 1|dposti, dOi, Xi) = 11 + e−zi with
zi = β0 + δ0dposti + βnmcdnmci + βsjrdsjri + βeasyjobsdeasyjobsi
+ δnmcdposti · dnmci + δsjrdposti · dsjri + δeasyjobsdposti · deasyjobsi
+Xiβ4. (6)
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The outcome variable is assumed to be determined by the logistic function, and thus the model is
nonlinear. In turn, the coefficient of the DID interaction cannot be interpreted as the ATT, and the
effects of the reform must be computed as differences of predicted probabilities. The corresponding
standard errors for the predicted probabilities can be obtained by applying the delta method.4
The dependent variable Yi is a binary variable that indicates self-employment in the stock models
and transition into or out of self-employment in the flow models. The conditional expectation of the
binary outcome equals the response probability, denoted by Prob(·). The regressors dposti, dOi, and
Xi are included in zi, where dposti is a dummy variable for individuals observed in the post-policy
period;5 dOi = dnmci, dsjri, deasyjobsi indicates an individual’s affiliation to one of the treatment
groups; and X is the vector of control variables. The specification includes interaction terms between
the respective treatment group indicators and the post-policy dummy. Moreover, δ0, δω, βω and β4,
with ω = nmc,sjr,easyjobs, represent the respective coefficients or vector of coefficients, and β0 is
a constant.
In addition to dummies for the years 2003 and 2004, all models include variables for the following
individual characteristics: age and its square, dummy variables indicating gender, type of secondary
schooling and professional qualification, nationality, region of residence, the size of the respondent’s
residence city, marital status, the number of children, the branch of craftsmanship, and a constant.
An indicator also reveals the citizenship of foreigners in a member state of the European Union (EU)
and its interaction with the post-policy period. Controlling for these characteristics is important for
two reasons. First, as indicated previously, the determinants of self-employment might have changed
over the time. Second, including these control variables allows me to estimate δˆω more efficiently.
The estimation sample consists of all craftsmen in a given year in the models for which the
dependent variable is the self-employment rate. The same population is used in the entry models.
Some unemployed or inactive persons do not report a profession, and thus it is unclear what
portion of these groups participates as reserve in the labor market for craftsmen. Because the
analysis excludes those who do not report an occupation, the results reflect an approximation of the
probability of entering self-employment from dependent employment, unemployment, or inactivity,
because not all potentially self-employed persons are included in the estimation sample.
The estimation sample of the exit models comprises self-employed craftsmen in the previous year.
Therefore, it is the population that possibly could exit from self-employment within the year. With
this sample, it is appropriate to estimate the probability of exit, because the dependent variable
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clearly indicates whether a person is not self-employed after 12 months, but instead is dependently
employed, unemployed, or inactive. Apart from these differences in the estimation population and
the response variables, the econometric framework is identical in the stock models and the flow
models.
V DATA AND DESCRIPTIVES
Sample Design
This analysis uses data from the German microcensus (Mikrozensus), which is provided by the
Federal Statistical Office. This official representative yearly household survey is comparable to the
Current Population Survey in the United States and the Labor Force Survey in the United Kingdom.
The German microcensus is a 1% sample of all households in Germany. A subsample of 70% or
approximately 500,000 observations per year, is selected at random and provided to researchers
as a scientific use file by the Federal Statistical Office. The large sample size is important for this
analysis, because less than 10% of the population are craftsmen. Most questions are subject to
compulsory response; the German microcensus is a mandatory census, which guarantees a low rate
of item non-response and ensures that entrepreneurs are adequately represented.
This analysis uses pooled cross-sections of the German microcensus from 2002 to 2006. Years
before 2002 are not considered for several reasons. First, effects of the amendment to the HwO from
1998 were still significant at the beginning of 2001, in that the process of adjusting expectations
and changing occupations in response to the reform took some time. Second, training in some
traditional occupations, such as blacksmith and turner, ceased to be in force as of August 2002,
superseded by more modern training structures with new fields of specialization. To avoid confusion
due to these influences, I excluded the year 2001 from the analysis. The results when I include this
wave are available on request.
The transition variables reflect questions from the supplementary program that ask for a person’s
employment status in the year before the interview, retrospectively. The supplementary questions
were only posed to a 45% random subsample of the microcensus up until 2004. Section B of the
Appendix provides a description of how the key variables are constructed.
Because the focus of this study is on entrepreneurship among German craftsmen, I restrict the
sample as follows: I exclude all individuals younger than 18 years or older than 65 years. People
whose occupational choice is conjecturally determined by different factors also are dropped from the
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sample to avoid distortions. Thus, civil servants (who may report being craftsmen), apprentices,
soldiers, conscripts, persons in education, or those drafted in the previous year, as well as all
remaining non-craftsmen, are excluded. Moreover, family workers helping in a family business are
not included in the sample, because they are not entrepreneurs in the sense that they run their
own businesses. This process leaves us with a sample of about 26,000 observations per year, which
represent nearly 4 million craftsmen in the German population.
Descriptives
In contrast with the development of the other occupational groups, as the upper left graph of Figure 2
shows, the number of nmc entries increased tremendously after 2004, returned to a somewhat lower
level in 2006, but still remained higher than in the period before the reform. The exits remained
constant for a time before declining in the aftermath of the policy change. Note that the balance
(defined as entry − exit) exhibits sa similar path as the number of self-employed craftsmen in
Figure 3, which implies that most of the variation stems from this particular group.
Although the figures roughly resemble the descriptions provided by Müller (2006), the German
microcensus does not allow me to identify precisely the exact professions, because of data protections
and the changes in the survey design after 2005.
Insert Figure 2 about here
The upper right graph in Figure 2 illustrates that neither the entries nor the exits of the strict
occupations exhibit any singularity over time. The path of the growth rate and the balance
correspond. Apparently, the numbers of entries and exits are both rather small. Sensitivity tests
correcting for rare events are available on request.
In the lower left graph of Figure 2, the transition variables do not exhibit any major oscillation,
other than a peak in 2003, in the difference of entries and exits for easyjobs. This peak is perceptible
in the growth rate as well. In the post-policy period, the growth rate increases substantially, but
the balance contrasts this development.
The series of transitional variables for sjr occupations depicted in the lower right part of Figure 2
show that the entries modestly increase, whereas the exits remain roughly constant. Here, the
balance series and the growth rate similarly show an increase in 2005 and a subsequent decrease in
2006.
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I report some characteristics of the four occupational groups in Table 1 as weighted averages from
the pooled cross-sections from 2002 to 2006.
Insert Table 1 about here
VI RESULTS
Treatment Effects on Self-Employment Probabilities
The results of the logit estimations in Table 2 refer to the probability of being self-employed and
the probabilities of entry into and exit out of self-employment, using pooled cross-sections from
2002 to 2006.
The positive coefficient of the interaction between the dummy for nmc professions and the dummy
indicating the post-policy period is highly significant in the model of the probability of being
self-employed, as well as in the model of the entry probability. The term is negative but insignificant
in the exit model. The coefficients for the interaction between the dummy for the easyjobs group
and the dummy for the post-policy period in the entry probability model are significant and positive.
In the self-employment probability model and the exit model, positive but insignificant coefficients
appear for this group. In contrast, all three models return insignificant coefficients on the interaction
term for the sjr professions.
As the first two columns reveal, the interaction effects between the indicator for citizenship in
an EU member country and the post-policy period dummy are positive, large, and significant.
However, the probability of being self-employed is higher for EU citizens before the policy change
compared with German craftsmen in strictly regulated occupations, which suggests that the relative
effect is not that large. Nevertheless, this result demonstrates the importance of controlling for this
confounding factor.
Insert Table 2 about here
To find the quantitative effect of the amendment on the probability of being self-employed, I
first predict probabilities using the estimates reported in Table 2. However, the correct means
to compute the treatment effect is subject to debate (e.g., Ai and Norton, 2003; Puhani, 2008).
Therefore, I present two alternative interpretations of the treatment effect for each model. These
alternatives rely on different counter-factual treatment effects, which can lead to dissimilar results.
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Having obtained the predicted probabilities in a first step, I calculate their differences, as well as the
difference of these differences, which represents the first interpretation of the treatment effect (see Ai
and Norton, 2003). Next, I predict the counter-factual probabilities for the post-policy period and
calculate the corresponding differences, as well as the counter-factual difference in these differences.
The treatment effect compliant with the second interpretation is that obtained in the first step,
subtracted from the counter-factual treatment effect (see Puhani, 2008). Table 3 summarizes the
outcomes of this procedure and reports in bold the treatment effects, with those according to the
first interpretation in the upper part and those according to the alternative at the bottom of the
table.
Insert Table 3 about here
A person with average characteristics in a nmc occupation has the lowest probability of being an
entrepreneur, both before and still after the policy change, in comparison with the other occupational
groups, though the amendment to the HwO caused this probability to increase significantly by 1.27
percentage points with a standard error of 0.78 (p-value: 0.10), as reported in the upper part of
Table 3. The probability of being self-employed would have been 6.69-1.27 = 5.42 in the hypothetical
situation without a reform, and thus, the relative effect of the policy change on the nmc occupations
equals 23.43%.
The absolute effect of the reform on this group in the bottom of this table amounts to 1.43
percentage points; with a standard error of 0.50 (p-value: 0.00), it is not much different from its
counterpart in the upper part of the table. In this interpretation, a counter-factual probability
of being self-employed is calculated for each treatment group in the post-policy period, which is
reported in the second row of the lower part of the table. The relative effect in turn can be calculated
with this value. In the case of the nmc professions, the counter-factual probability in the first
column is 6.69-1.43 = 5.26%, such that the relative effect of the reform equals 27.19%.
Analogously, the effects of the reform on the sjr and easyjobs occupations increased the probability
of being self-employed by 1.27 and 1.25 percentage points when I interpret each single cross-difference
as the respective treatment effect. These effects just fail to achieve statistical significance at the
10% level with standard errors of 0.80 and 0.82 (p-values: 0.11 and 0.13), respectively. In relative
terms, the effects amount to 12.03% for the sjr vocations and 14.50% for the easyjobs professions.
Similar relative effects of 11.60% and 14.90%, respectively, result from the alternative definition of
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the treatment effect, and the absolute effects of the reform in this interpretation of 1.23% and 1.28%,
with standard errors of 0.89 and 0.78 (p-values: 0.17 and 0.10), resemble those reported previously.
Treatment Effects on Transition Probabilities
Insert Table 4 about here
I also examine the quantitative effects of the reform on the probability of entry into self-employment,
as reported in Table 4. Again it is obvious that the nmc group is special, in the sense that the
probability of engaging in entrepreneurship for a person with average characteristics in this group
is substantially lower than that of the other occupational groups, especially before the reform.
Consistent with my prior findings, entry probability increased due to the reform by 0.75 (0.68)6
percentage points. This economically relevant effect is also statistically significant with a standard
error of 0.35 (0.24) (p-value: 0.03 (0.00)). Entry probability thus has been almost doubled with the
reform, because its relative effect amounts to 96.15% (80.00%).
For the sjr and easyjobs professions, a smaller, marginally significant, positive effect emerges.
The former group experienced an increase in the probability of entry of 0.58 (0.59) percentage points,
with a standard error of 0.36 (0.35) (p-value: 0.11 (0.09)), whereas for the latter, I find an increase of
0.61 (0.56) percentage points with a standard error of 0.36 (0.28) (p-value: 0.09 (0.04)). In relative
terms, the reform increased the entry probability of the sjr to a level 42.03% (43.07%) higher. For
easyjobs, the entry probability is 62.89% (54.90%) higher than the hypothetical situation without
the reform.
These results imply that the increase in the probabilities of being self-employed is largely a result
of the positive effects of the reform on the entry probabilities. However, these increases could be
accompanied by increased exit probabilities. As we found, both the probabilities of entering nmc
occupations and being self-employed in these professions showed significant increases. Thus, the
exit rates cannot be high enough to offset the effects of the entry probabilities completely, but they
still could have increased. This finding would be consistent with the view that a fraction of the new
entrepreneurs in the post-policy period use fly-by-night tactics. Moreover, constant or lower exit
probabilities are also possible.
Insert Table 5 about here
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To clarify these possibilities, in Table 5 I provide the effects of the amendment of the HwO on the
probability of exit from self-employment. The reform’s effect for the nmc occupations is -1.27 (-0.19)
percentage points with a standard error of 1.31 (1.52). This negative effect is insignificant (p-value:
0.33 (0.90)). Consequently, the hypothesis that the reform had no impact on the probability of exit
cannot be rejected, although the negative point estimate gives the idea that the exit probability could
have been decreased. A similar conclusion applies to the sjr and easyjobs vocations, because the
point estimates of -0.63 (-0.45) and 0.24 (0.29), respectively, are highly insignificant with standard
errors of 1.18 (0.93) and 1.24 (0.90) (p-values: 0.59 (0.63) and 0.85 (0.75)), respectively.
Specification and Sensitivity Tests
To assess the validity of the assumptions on which the DID approach is based, and to gauge the
robustness of the findings in this analysis, the logit models of the probability of being self-employed
and of the transition probabilities are reestimated, varying the specification, the definition of
variables, and the estimation sample.
As a first test, I scrutinized whether other influences than the actual treatment on the treatment
groups were present but did not influence the comparison group. Such influences would have
confounded the analysis. In most settings, there is no way to test for these influences directly, so
“placebo tests” based on the idea of reestimating the models while pretending that the policy event
took place in a year prior to the actual policy change, are employed. First, the post-policy period
indicator is redefined to represent the period from 2003 to 2004, as if the policy change had taken
place in late 2002. Second, the logit model for the probability of being self-employed is reestimated
without the actual post-policy period to avoid measuring the true effect of the reform. These steps
are repeated for a placebo policy reform in late 2003.
As columns II and IV in Table A.1 in the Appendix show, the interaction coefficients in both
placebo tests are insignificant, which would not be the case if confounding factors existed before
the policy change. Therefore, assuming this result extends to the post-policy period, the validity
of the identifying assumption of the DID analysis receives support. In contrast, columns I and III
show significant coefficients for the interaction terms, in particular for the sjr occupations, when
the estimation sample includes the year 2001 – which is why the main analysis was based on the
sample from 2002 to 2006.
Furthermore, the assumption of common trends can be examined more explicitly, using the full
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sample from 2001 to 2004 and the restricted sample from 2002 to 2004. After including interaction
terms between occupational groups and a time trend, I estimate the logit models for the probability
of being self-employed. Columns I and II in Table A.2 in the Appendix again show significant effects
when 2001 is included; excluding this year demonstrates that no significant differences in the trends
of the occupational groups exist in the period before the policy change. The assumption that this
result is also true for the post-policy period is necessary for the identification of the ATT.
Although these two tests provide evidence of the validity of the identifying assumption, they rely
on a key assumption for the post-policy period. However, the treatment groups and the control
group comprise occupations of different branches, so it is possible to control for branch-specific
trends. A time trend interacted with the dummy variables indicates branch affiliation in the model
of the self-employment probability. This term can capture not just differential trends between the
branches of craftsmanship but also between the treatment and control groups. To illustrate, suppose
that a macro variable influences the building and construction sector proportionally more severely
than it does the health and hygiene trades during the sample period. This differential trend would
be captured by the time trend interactions with the respective branch dummies and thus guarantee
that the branches in each treatment group and the control group have common trends.
Column III in Table A.2 contains the results of this test for the entire period from 2002 to
2006. The interaction term is only significant for the building and construction trades, and the
foodstuffs trades (not reported). Evidently, the general results are robust to this variation of the
specification. The comparison of the coefficients of the interaction of the treatment groups and the
policy dummy with those obtained in the main analysis reveals quite small differences. Thus, the
necessary condition of common trends is met.
Another robustness check investigates the potential influence of less than clear-cut definitions of
the treatment and control groups. To determine if the estimates are influenced by the fuzziness of
the job definitions, I use a narrower definition of craftsmanship to reestimate the models from the
main analysis. This narrower definition excludes those occupations that cannot be unequivocally
found in the data. The results in Table A.3 in the Appendix imply that the estimates in the main
analysis are robust to this change of definitions, because the coefficients remain similar in size and
significance.
Sensitivity tests correcting for rare events and varying the definition of the treatments and the
control group are available on request.
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Other Entrepreneurship Policies
Two major policies that could have interfered with the effects of the policy change include the
enlargement of the European Union in 2004 and entrepreneurship subsidies. The enlargement of
the EU based on the Treaty of Accession of 2003 took place in 2004, when ten countries became
new member states. This event eased access for foreign entrepreneurs and thus was of relevance for
craftsmanship in Germany (cf. Müller, 2008). Other important policy instruments are subsidies to
entrepreneurs, such as transitional allowance (Überbrückungsgeld), start-up subsidy (Existenzgrün-
dungszuschuss, EXGZ), entrance grant for entrepreneurs (Einstiegsgeld für selbständige Tätigkeit),
and another start-up subsidy (Gründungszuschuss) (cf. Caliendo and Steiner, 2005). According to
Baumgartner et al. (2006), the EXGZ in particular has significant effects on entrepreneurship.
Insert Figure 3 about here
Figure 3 shows three graphs from 2002 to 2006: the development of total self-employed crafts-
manship, the number of craftsmen who did not report receiving PPI payments (a dummy for public
payments), and the number of German self-employed craftsmen. In Appendix B, I explain how this
dummy for public payments is constructed. It captures only substantial subsidies and is designed
according to the qualities of the EXGZ. The graphs evolve almost uniformly over time, which
suggests that the enlargement of the EU and the subsidies did not affect the number of self-employed
craftsmen systematically.
All three series experienced a substantial increase after the amendment to the HwO came into
effect. The number of self-employed craftsmen jumped from 518,163, measured a year before the
reform, to 579,036 in 2005 and then to 584,494 in 2006. This enormous change is also documented
for the stock of businesses by Müller (2006), who uses data from the register of craftsmen. These
numbers equal, for each year, approximately 90% of the stock of businesses reported in Müller
(2006) which confirms how well these occupations are represented in the data. Note that this result
holds after accounting for the actual stock of businesses, which is approximately 15% lower than
the reported stock.
To check, whether other entrepreneurship policies could have biased the estimation results, I
reestimated the models of the main analysis for different samples. Although the effects of the
enlargement of the EU are controlled for by the dummy variable indicating citizenship of non-
Germans in an EU member country and its interaction with the dummy for the post-policy period
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in the main analysis, this test restricts the sample to German individuals only and excludes both
EU and non-EU foreigners. According to Table A.4 in the Appendix, the estimated coefficients are
somewhat smaller in the model of the self-employment probability compared with the main results.
In the entry model, the coefficient of the nmc interaction term is slightly greater, whereas the other
interaction terms have almost identical coefficients. In the exit model, all three coefficients again
are insignificant. Therefore, the estimations are not distorted because of the enlargement of the EU.
To examine the influence of subsidies for entrepreneurs, I exclude all individuals from the estimation
sample who indicated having received substantial public payments, that is, if the binary variable
PPI defined in the Appendix B equals 1. This shift has little effect on the previous findings, though
the coefficients in Table A.5 in the Appendix are slightly smaller. Excluding all individuals who
reported having received any public payment (PPII) other than pensions, social benefits like housing
or unemployment benefits, and scholarships, I again find coefficients similar in size and significance
(results are available on request). Thus, the results are not distorted by public payments.
VII SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In the pursuit of an answer to the question of what keeps entrepreneurs from starting a business,
this paper begins with a simple model of occupational choice to illustrate the qualities of two kinds
of regulations. The paragon of entry regulation is the rip-off regulation that appears in most studies
concerned with entry regulation and imposes costs without affecting the expected income of an
entrepreneur positively. In contrast, pay-off regulations can have a positive effect on expected
entrepreneurial income, in addition to that on the costs. From this point of view, the pay-off
regulation represents an investment in human capital. However, the effects of such a regulation on
the probability of starting a business depend on specific parameters and variable values.
Thus, to understand the nature of this kind of regulation, this study has examined the various
features of the amendment to the HwO in 2004, which intended to foster self-employment in the
highly regulated sector of craftsmanship. Among other modifications, these legislative changes
exempted one group of craftsmen completely and another partially from the requirement of passing
a master examination for admission as entrepreneur. Moreover, for a third occupational group,
the entry requirement has been reduced. The reform also provides a natural comparison group,
because for some professions, the entry requirement remained mandatory. Therefore, four distinct
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occupational groups can be identified in data from the German microcensus from 2002 to 2006 and
be exploited within this setting in a natural experiment.
The results from a DID analysis provide evidence that the probability of being self-employed
increased with the amendment to the HwO among the nmc group. For both alternative definitions
of the treatment effects, the strongest relative increase amounts to more than 20%, which occurred in
the group of craftsmen completely exempted from the entry requirement. This finding is consistent
with the notion that the level of entry regulation imposed by the HwO before the reform hampered
entry into entrepreneurship instead of providing necessary human capital. Consequently, the
regulation exhibited the properties of a rip-off regulation. In professions that experienced only
a reduction or a partial exemption from the entry requirement, the results indicated only weak,
positive effects. The analysis shows further that these increases are caused by increases to the
probabilities of entry, whereas the probabilities of exit from self-employment remained virtually
unaffected by the policy change. Various robustness checks support the findings of this study.
Two key results have important policy implications. First, the strongest relative effect applies
to an occupational group with a relatively low probability of entrepreneurship and entry. The
effects of a future reform to reduce the costs of entry regulation in the regulated professions with
a comparatively high probability of being self-employed therefore might result in rather meager
changes in the self-employment rate. Figure 1 shows that the self-employment rate is already higher
among craftsmen than among the total working population. Although there might be some potential
to increase entrepreneurship among craftsmen further, implementing an entrepreneurial culture in
other sectors first could be more beneficial.
Second, persons who work in jobs that require only a relatively low level of qualification have a
lower probability of starting a business. When an educational requirement is imposed, the probability
falls even lower, as is true for workers in nmc professions who achieved a lower average qualification
and benefited in the post-policy period from the entry requirement exemption by engaging more in
entrepreneurship. In this case, the required educational level was inadequate for the educational
requirements of the jobs and hindered transitions into self-employment. The same conclusion applies
to unemployed and inactive workers who were restrained from entry into self-employed by this
inadequate educational requirement, because a large fraction of this group had low qualifications.
Consequently, there are two ways to help an individual jump the hurdle to self-employment. First,
reducing the size of the hurdle can help. Second, promoting professional education could lead to
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greater jumping power. As the results have demonstrated, occupational groups in craftsmanship
are heterogeneous. Therefore, a general entry requirement is suboptimal if it does not consider the
heterogeneous propensities for education.
One of the caveats to be taken into consideration is that this analysis is based on limited
observations for the post-policy period, which includes only two years after the amendment to the
HwO. The effects of this policy change might still be significant in subsequent periods, so the results
of this analysis should be regarded with appropriate caution.
For policy makers, the results suggest that reducing entry regulation may be considered a suitable
policy instrument to promote entrepreneurship; reforming a regulation with rip-off characteristics
could release some beneficial energies by invoking an entrepreneurial spirit.
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1When a major amendment to the HwO reduced the number of regular craftsmanship occupations
from 127 to 94 in 1998, the entry requirement for A-occupations remained untouched.
2There are non-craft occupations for which a person can obtain a master degree. However,
according to Müller (2006), approximately 70% of all master examinations involve craftsmanship.
3This amendment is based on two laws, the grand amendment to HwO (Drittes Gesetz zur
Änderung der Handwerksordnung und anderer handwerksrechtlicher Vorschriften) and the small
amendment to HwO (Gesetz zur Änderung der Handwerksordnung und zur Förderung von Kleinun-
ternehmen).
4In case the optimal step size search did not converge, bootstrapped standard errors were
computed.
5The post-policy period is defined as the period from 2004 to 2006. However, the data from 2004
refer to the beginning of this year, which basically represents the status quo ante, so the post-policy
period in this analysis includes only the years 2005 and 2006. The post-policy dummy equals 1 for
both years, which prevents the interaction effect from differing in the post-policy periods.
6The effects, standard errors, and p-values calculated according to Ai and Norton (2003) are
reported, followed in parentheses by the respective values calculated according to Puhani (2008).
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1: Weighted averages by treatment and control groups in pooled sample
Unit nmc sjr easyjobs strictmaster
Female (%) 58.95 17.11 3.00 42.04
Age (a) 42.97 39.15 39.50 39.17
Residency in the East (%) 16.70 21.39 23.37 17.27
Self-employed (%) 8.49 16.50 13.36 19.82
Job tenure (a) 8.81 10.36 10.63 9.96
Nationality
German (%) 80.92 90.39 90.72 95.62
EU (%) 5.08 3.69 3.41 2.00
Non-EU (%) 13.99 5.92 5.87 2.39
Professional qualification
University (%) 1.18 0.81 0.30 0.95
UAS∗ (%) 0.97 1.27 0.54 1.56
Master of crafts (%) 5.56 17.92 16.44 27.36
Apprenticeship (%) 55.87 67.16 70.95 63.64
No qualification (%) 32.17 9.18 8.05 3.18
Non-response (%) 4.26 3.67 3.72 3.31
Secondary School
Qualification for (%) 5.24 4.93 2.78 16.16
university entrance
Other secondary school (%) 84.78 90.58 92.57 81.12
No qualification (%) 6.54 1.80 1.81 0.26
Non-response (%) 3.44 2.70 2.84 2.45
Children under 16 (#) 0.59 0.58 0.55 0.50
Married (%) 70.02 59.33 59.45 57.67
City size
> 500,000 inhabitants (%) 13.97 10.75 9.84 12.07
20,000− 500,000 (%) 45.12 38.71 37.88 43.94
≤ 20,000 (%) 40.91 50.54 52.28 43.98
Incomes
Public payment I (%) 0.51 0.87 0.69 0.78
Personal net income (k) 1.0051 1.4289 1.4609 1.5663
HH net income (k) 2.1486 2.3667 2.3389 2.7541
Capital income (%) 1.10 1.63 1.44 2.80
Rent income (%) 2.53 4.79 5.06 6.51
Percentage of all self-
employed craftsmen
25.13 46.57 22.77 5.53
Number of observations 8,090 7,715 4,660 763
* University of applied sciences.
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Figure 1: Self-employment and craftsmanship in Germany. Left ordinate: Number of self-employed
and craftsmen in thousands. Right ordinate: Percentage share of self-employed among working popu-














2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Entry (k) Exit (k)
Balance (k) Growth Rate of Number of Self−Employed (%)









2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Entry (k) Exit (k)
Balance (k) Growth Rate of Number of Self−Employed (%)










2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Entry (k) Exit (k)
Balance (k) Growth Rate of Number of Self−Employed (%)














2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Entry (k) Exit (k)
Balance (k) Growth Rate of Number of Self−Employed (%)
Amendment to the HwO
Figure 2: Entries into and exits from self-employment and their difference among nmc (upper left),
strict (upper right), easyjobs (lower left), and sjr (lower right). Left ordinates: Number in thou-
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Self−Employed Craftsmen (k) SE−Craftsmen without PPI (k)
German Self−Employed Craftsmen (k)
Amendment to the HwO
Figure 3: Craftsmanship and entrepreneurship policies. Total, unsubsidized, and German self-
employed craftsmanship in thousands. Source: Own calculations based on the scientific use file of
the German microcensus (2002-2006).
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Table 2: Logit estimation results of self-employment state and transition
probabilities
Self-employed Entry Exit
nmc·policy 0.2554∗∗∗ 0.5949∗∗ −0.0747
(0.0968) (0.2593) (0.5628)
sjr·policy 0.1235 0.3630 −0.3119
(0.0937) (0.2499) (0.5661)
easyjobs·policy 0.1531 0.4447∗ 0.1745
(0.0977) (0.2632) (0.5837)
eu·policy 0.3767∗∗∗ 0.4967∗ −0.4452
(0.1147) (0.2963) (0.5734)
nmc −0.6210∗∗∗ −0.4210∗∗ 0.6394∗
(0.0635) (0.1967) (0.3718)
sjr 0.1378∗∗ 0.0614 0.1384
(0.0646) (0.1972) (0.3704)
easyjobs −0.0947 −0.2369 0.0389
(0.0690) (0.2129) (0.3924)
policy 0.0333 −0.1661 −0.6316
(0.0908) (0.2434) (0.5448)
eu 0.5453∗∗∗ 0.2023 −0.5876
(0.0971) (0.2821) (0.4344)
Constant −5.5861∗∗∗ −4.6591∗∗∗ 1.8972∗
(0.1753) (0.4301) (0.9914)
Year dummies X X X
Branch dummies X X X
Controls X X X
Wald χ2 17879.69 1160.73 436.03
Log likelihood -36825.30 -7347.11 -1383.53
Number of observations 123539 83040 9267
Notes: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses below logit coeffi-
cients.
Significance of the logit coefficients is indicated at the 10%/5%/1% level by asterisks
(∗/∗∗/∗∗∗).
Source: Own calculations based on the scientific use file of the German microcensus
(2002-2006).
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Table 3: Probabilities of being self-employed (in %): Difference in differences
nmc sjr easyjobs strict ∆nmc ∆sjr ∆easyjobs
Before reform 2004 5.04 10.18 8.24 8.99 −3.95 1.19 −0.74
(0.15) (0.21) (0.24) (0.49) (0.49) (0.54) (0.56)
After reform 2004 6.69 11.83 9.87 9.36 −2.68 2.46 0.51
(0.23) (0.29) (0.33) (0.64) (0.65) (0.69) (0.72)
∆ between after and 1.65 1.65 1.63 0.38 1.27 1.27 1.25
before reform 2004 (0.24) (0.34) (0.37) (0.76) (0.78) (0.80) (0.82)
Before reform 2004 5.04 10.18 8.24 8.99 −3.95 1.19 −0.74
(0.15) (0.21) (0.24) (0.49) (0.49) (0.54) (0.56)
After reform 2004 5.26 10.60 8.59 9.36 −4.10 1.24 −0.77
(0.47) (0.88) (0.75) (0.64) (0.43) (0.61) (0.55)
∆ between after and 0.22 0.42 0.35 0.38 −0.16 0.04 −0.03
before reform 2004 (0.45) (0.86) (0.71) (0.76) (0.31) (0.10) (0.05)
∆∆ 1.43 1.23 1.28
(0.50) (0.89) (0.78)
Notes: Expected probability of a person with average characteristics. The average of the probability
among actual persons in the data yields similar results and is available upon request.
Standard errors calculated by the delta method are in parentheses. Source: Own calculations based on
the scientific use file of the German microcensus (2002-2006).
Table 4: Probabilities of entry into self-employment (in %): Difference in differences
nmc sjr easyjobs strict ∆nmc ∆sjr ∆easyjobs
Before reform 2004 0.99 1.59 1.18 1.50 −0.51 0.09 −0.31
(0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.27) (0.27) (0.29) (0.30)
After reform 2004 1.53 1.96 1.58 1.29 0.24 0.67 0.29
(0.13) (0.12) (0.14) (0.22) (0.24) (0.26) (0.26)
∆ between after and 0.54 0.37 0.40 −0.21 0.75 0.58 0.61
before reform 2004 (0.15) (0.17) (0.17) (0.34) (0.35) (0.36) (0.36)
Before reform 2004 0.99 1.59 1.18 1.50 −0.51 0.09 −0.31
(0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.27) (0.27) (0.29) (0.30)
After reform 2004 0.85 1.37 1.02 1.29 −0.44 0.08 −0.27
(0.22) (0.33) (0.26) (0.22) (0.19) (0.27) (0.23)
∆ between after and −0.14 −0.22 −0.16 −0.21 0.07 −0.01 0.04
before reform 2004 (0.21) (0.33) (0.25) (0.34) (0.13) (0.03) (0.09)
∆∆ 0.68 0.59 0.56
(0.24) (0.35) (0.28)
Notes: Expected probability of a person with average characteristics. The average of the probability
among actual persons in the data yields similar results and is available upon request.
Standard errors calculated by the delta method are in parentheses. Source: Own calculations based on
the scientific use file of the German microcensus (2002-2006).
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Table 5: (Logit) Probabilities of exit from self-employment (in %): Difference in differences
nmc sjr easyjobs strict ∆nmc ∆sjr ∆easyjobs
Before reform 2004 5.16 3.19 2.90 2.79 2.37 0.40 0.11
(0.76) (0.47) (0.55) (0.97) (1.16) (1.02) (1.07)
After reform 2004 2.58 1.25 1.83 1.49 1.10 −0.23 0.35
(0.39) (0.20) (0.34) (0.63) (0.72) (0.65) (0.70)
∆ between after and −2.58 −1.94 −1.07 −1.31 -1.27 -0.63 0.24
before reform 2004 (0.80) (0.49) (0.63) (1.13) (1.31) (1.18) (1.24)
Before reform 2004 5.16 3.19 2.90 2.79 2.37 0.40 0.11
(0.76) (0.47) (0.55) (0.97) (1.16) (1.02) (1.07)
After reform 2004 2.78 1.70 1.54 1.49 1.29 0.22 0.06
(1.50) (0.92) (0.86) (0.63) (1.11) (0.62) (0.60)
∆ between after and −2.38 −1.49 −1.36 −1.31 −1.08 −0.18 −0.05
before reform 2004 (1.54) (0.96) (0.88) (1.13) (0.64) (0.42) (0.48)
∆∆ -0.19 -0.45 0.29
(1.52) (0.93) (0.90)
Notes: Expected probability of a person with average characteristics. The average of the probability
among actual persons in the data yields similar results and is available upon request.
Standard errors calculated by the delta method are in parentheses. Source: Own calculations based on
the scientific use file of the German microcensus (2002-2006).
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Appendix
A SPECIFICATION AND SENSITIVITY TESTS
Table A.1: Placebo estimation results of the logit model
Self-employed: Self-employed: Self-employed: Self-employed:
Placebo reform Placebo reform Placebo reform Placebo reform
in 2002 in 2002 in 2003 in 2003
(2001-2004) (2002-2004) (2001-2004) (2002-2004)
I II III IV
nmc·policy 0.1823∗ 0.0322 0.1630 0.0606
(0.1042) (0.1283) (0.1228) (0.1299)
sjr·policy 0.2655∗∗∗ 0.1346 0.2222∗ 0.1161
(0.1002) (0.1237) (0.1183) (0.1252)
easyjobs·policy 0.1979∗ 0.1389 0.1526 0.0903
(0.1048) (0.1293) (0.1239) (0.1311)
eu·policy 0.2770∗ 0.3177∗ 0.2823∗ 0.2627
(0.1443) (0.1797) (0.1620) (0.1717)
nmc −0.7684∗∗∗ −0.6510∗∗∗ −0.7188∗∗∗ −0.6494∗∗∗
(0.0764) (0.1081) (0.0644) (0.0791)
sjr −0.0440 0.0653 0.0328 0.1167
(0.0780) (0.1083) (0.0669) (0.0810)
easyjobs −0.1922∗∗ −0.1572 −0.1319∗ −0.0945
(0.0830) (0.1145) (0.0715) (0.0864)
policy −0.1270 −0.0672 −0.0635 −0.0250
(0.0960) (0.1171) (0.1135) (0.1197)
eu 0.4217∗∗∗ 0.3352∗∗ 0.4904∗∗∗ 0.4618∗∗∗
(0.1222) (0.1658) (0.1042) (0.1230)
Constant −5.6950∗∗∗ −5.6484∗∗∗ −5.7564∗∗∗ −5.6847∗∗∗
(0.2017) (0.2378) (0.1984) (0.2283)
Year dummies X X X X
Branch dummies X X X X
Controls X X X X
Wald χ2 14886.09 11028.52 14898.34 11035.04
Log likelihood -28593.64 -21454.22 -28594.27 -21454.11
Number of obser-
vations
101709 75137 101709 75137
Notes: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses below logit coefficients.
Significance of the logit coefficients is indicated at the 10%/5%/1% level by asterisks (∗/∗∗/∗∗∗).
Source: Own calculations based on the scientific use file of the German microcensus (2002-2006).
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Table A.2: Logit estimation results of self-employment probabilities
Self-employed: Self-employed: Self-employed:
Groups · time trend Groups · time trend Branches · time trend
(2001-2004) (2002-2004) (2002-2006)
I II III
nmc·time trend 0.1067∗∗ 0.0309
(0.0467) (0.0751)










nmc −0.8364∗∗∗ −0.6911∗∗∗ −0.6329∗∗∗
(0.0889) (0.1632) (0.0641)
sjr −0.1155 −0.0123 0.1543∗∗
(0.0894) (0.1600) (0.0666)




Constant −5.6276∗∗∗ −5.6223∗∗∗ −5.6271∗∗∗
(0.2052) (0.2621) (0.1924)
Year dummies X X X
Branch dummies X X X
Branch·trend X
Controls X X X
Wald χ2 14894.23 11033.50 17903.66




Notes: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses below logit coefficients.
Significance of the logit coefficients is indicated at the 10%/5%/1% level by asterisks (∗/∗∗/∗∗∗).
Source: Own calculations based on the scientific use file of the German microcensus (2002-2006).
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Table A.3: Logit estimation results using a narrow definition of craftsmanship
Self-employed Entry Exit
nmc·policy 0.2688∗∗∗ 0.5504∗∗ 0.0521
(0.0997) (0.2655) (0.5766)
sjr·policy 0.1074 0.3585 −0.2692
(0.0958) (0.2536) (0.5849)
easyjobs·policy 0.0965 0.4513 −0.0379
(0.1082) (0.2911) (0.6414)
eu·policy 0.3351∗∗ 0.8005∗ 0.1846
(0.1484) (0.4303) (0.8762)
nmc −0.3855∗∗∗ −0.2430 0.6875∗
(0.0704) (0.2097) (0.3835)
sjr 0.4009∗∗∗ 0.1562 −0.0357
(0.0689) (0.2053) (0.3842)
easyjobs 0.3993∗∗∗ 0.0274 0.3578
(0.0825) (0.2500) (0.4635)
policy 0.0457 −0.1918 −0.7558
(0.0924) (0.2460) (0.5528)
eu 0.6641∗∗∗ −0.0806 −1.3580∗∗
(0.1269) (0.4133) (0.6816)
Constant −6.2669∗∗∗ −4.8881∗∗∗ 3.1339∗∗∗
(0.2115) (0.5092) (1.1339)
Year dummies X X X
Branch dummies X X X
Controls X X X
Wald χ2 13504.06 917.55 342.58
Log likelihood -26165.54 -5308.22 -945.67
Number of observations 88999 59865 6583
Notes: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses below logit coefficients.
Significance of the logit coefficients is indicated at the 10%/5%/1% level by asterisks
(∗/∗∗/∗∗∗).
Source: Own calculations based on the scientific use file of the German microcensus
(2002-2006).
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Table A.4: Logit estimation results on German sample
Self-employed Entry Exit
nmc·policy 0.2345∗∗ 0.6301∗∗ −0.1961
(0.0988) (0.2631) (0.5825)
sjr·policy 0.0936 0.3639 −0.3023
(0.0955) (0.2530) (0.5821)
easyjobs·policy 0.1211 0.4421∗ 0.0384
(0.0996) (0.2674) (0.6027)
nmc −0.5741∗∗∗ −0.4415∗∗ 0.6618∗
(0.0647) (0.1992) (0.3944)
sjr 0.1649∗∗ 0.0157 0.1578
(0.0656) (0.1988) (0.3913)
easyjobs −0.0361 −0.2626 0.0834
(0.0702) (0.2159) (0.4146)
policy 0.0536 −0.1685 −0.6426
(0.0923) (0.2456) (0.5596)
Constant −5.2614∗∗∗ −4.7247∗∗∗ 1.6213
(0.1731) (0.4308) (1.0262)
Year dummies X X X
Branch dummies X X X
Controls X X X
Wald χ2 16665.72 1068.66 358.11
Log likelihood -34065.47 -6626.63 -1245.90
Number of observations 111216 74903 8630
Notes: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses below logit coeffi-
cients.
Significance of the logit coefficients is indicated at the 10%/5%/1% level by asterisks
(∗/∗∗/∗∗∗).
Source: Own calculations based on the scientific use file of the German microcensus
(2002-2006).
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Table A.5: Logit estimation results on unsubsidized craftsmen sample (PPI)
Self-employed Entry Exit
nmc·policy 0.2175∗∗ 0.5274∗ −0.0637
(0.0987) (0.2754) (0.5631)
sjr·policy 0.1106 0.3486 −0.2971
(0.0954) (0.2648) (0.5660)
easyjobs·policy 0.1381 0.3683 0.2070
(0.0995) (0.2788) (0.5840)
eu·policy 0.3680∗∗∗ 0.4930 −0.4265
(0.1187) (0.3189) (0.5802)
nmc −0.6161∗∗∗ −0.4327∗∗ 0.6370∗
(0.0648) (0.2084) (0.3699)
sjr 0.1381∗∗ 0.0475 0.1229
(0.0660) (0.2089) (0.3678)
easyjobs −0.0895 −0.2011 −0.0014
(0.0704) (0.2250) (0.3904)
policy 0.0325 −0.1413 −0.6332
(0.0924) (0.2572) (0.5445)
eu 0.6486∗∗∗ 0.2979 −0.6654
(0.1020) (0.3065) (0.4415)
Constant −5.7886∗∗∗ −4.5528∗∗∗ 2.0798∗∗
(0.1818) (0.4555) (0.9928)
Year dummies X X X
Branch dummies X X X
Controls X X X
Wald χ2 17538.58 1076.52 443.60
Log likelihood -35239.31 -6458.17 -1363.51
Number of observations 122697 82435 8929
Notes: Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses below logit coefficients.
Significance of the logit coefficients is indicated at the 10%/5%/1% level by asterisks
(∗/∗∗/∗∗∗).
Source: Own calculations based on the scientific use file of the German microcensus
(2002-2006).
B DESCRIPTION OF KEY VARIABLES
Entrepreneur: Are you working as self-employed (with or without employees)?
NMC, SJR, Easyjobs, Strict: Job title of most recent occupation. Occupational groups are con-
structed according to job titles in HwO.
Policy: Dummy indicating the post policy period from 2005 to 2006.
Entry, Exit: Employment status in previous year. This non-mandatory question was included before
2005 for 0.45% of the German population and for 1% of the German population in 2005 and
2006.
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Public Payment I: Indicates receiving significant subsidies. The questionnaire asks: How many and
which public payments or subsidies do you receive? No response option for entrepreneurship
subsidies, but for other public payments. Accounting for child benefit, other subsidies like first-
home buyer allowance are not distinguishable from entrepreneurship subsidies. Nevertheless,
after excluding individuals eligible for child benefit, a dummy variable includes all recently
(assuming start-ups are subsidized at most for three years) self-employed individuals, who
earn below 26,076 Euro (close to the 25,000 Euro threshold of the EXGZ) per year and receive
public payments. Although this approach fits the figures of the Federal Employment Agency
quite well, the reader should be aware of how it was constructed. This variable is used in
Tables 1 and A.5.
Public Payment II: Indicates receiving any subsidies. The questionnaire asks: How many other
public payments or subsidies do you receive? A dummy is created for individuals who
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